当前位置: X-MOL 学术National Tax Journal › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Deterring Property Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia: An Experimental Evaluation of Nudge Strategies
National Tax Journal ( IF 1.8 ) Pub Date : 2019-09-01 , DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2019.3.01
Michael Chirico , Robert Inman , Charles Loeffler , John MacDonald , Holger Sieg

Municipal governments commonly confront the problem of tardy or delinquent property tax payments. We implement an experiment in property tax collection for tardy taxpayers in the City of Philadelphia for the calendar year, 2015. The experiment sent one of seven reminder letters to the tardy taxpayers, testing the efficacy of a simple reminder, two alternative reminders stressing economic sanctions, and four alternative reminders emphasizing either that taxpayers receive neighborhood services or city-wide services for their tax payments, that most of their neighbors pay their taxes on time, or that as a citizen in a democracy it is a civic duty to pay taxes on time. Compliance behaviors were compared to a holdout sample that received no reminder letter. The most effective letters were those that threatened an economic sanction for continued non-compliance. These letters were particularly cost-effective in raising additional city revenues. There was no evidence that those receiving a reminder for the calendar year 2015 improved their tax compliance behavior in the calendar year 2016.

中文翻译:

遏制费城财产税违法行为:轻推策略的实验评估

市政府通常面临迟交或拖欠的财产税问题。我们在2015日历年为费城的滞纳性纳税人实施了一项财产税征收实验。该实验向滞纳性纳税人发送了七封催款信中的一封,测试了一个简单催款的有效性,另外两种提醒强调经济制裁,以及另外四个提醒事项,强调纳税人要么接受社区服务,要么获得全市范围内的税收服务;大多数邻居按时纳税;或者作为民主国家的公民,纳税是公民的义务时间。将合规行为与未收到提醒函的保留样本进行了比较。最有效的信是那些威胁要继续对不遵守情事处以经济制裁的信。这些信件在增加城市收入方面特别具有成本效益。没有证据表明那些在2015日历年收到提醒的人在2016日历年改善了其税务合规行为。
更新日期:2019-09-01
down
wechat
bug