This paper develops a model of tax competition with three countries, which initially form a union where countries refrain from using different tax rates in different sectors of the economy. We study the impact of one country leaving the union. We show that the introduction of discriminatory taxation in one country increases tax policy heterogeneity within the remaining union. Moreover, the incentives for the two remaining countries to harmonize their tax rates decline. We discuss these results in the context of the debate about the tax policy implications of Brexit.

中文翻译：

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英国退欧将如何影响税收竞争和税收协调？歧视性税收的作用

本文建立了与三个国家的税收竞争的模型，这三个国家最初形成了一个联盟，在该联盟中，各国避免在经济的不同部门使用不同的税率。我们研究了一个国家退出联盟的影响。我们表明，在一个国家引入歧视性税收会增加其余联盟内部的税收政策异质性。此外，其余两个国家协调其税率的动机也在下降。我们在关于英国退欧对税收政策影响的辩论中讨论这些结果。