Chief executive officer (CEO) ability may have an effect on various corporate reporting decisions, and consequently, the CEO ability is subject to scrutiny by regulatory reviewers. However, theoretical literature provides mixed evidence on how the CEO ability affects the regulatory review risk. Thus, this study aims to empirically examine the effect of CEO ability on regulatory review risk.,To measure CEO ability, this study uses the CEO ability-score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). Further, to measure regulatory review risk, the study uses the probability of receiving a comment letter from the Securities and Exchange Organization of Iran.,This study finds that the relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk is generally negative and statistically significant but not economically significant, i.e. the relationship is very small. In this regard, the study shows that the relationship is negative and also statistically and economically significant for firms with low levels of agency conflicts and high levels of corporate governance quality; and is positive and also statistically and economically significant for firms with high levels of agency conflicts and low levels of corporate governance quality. In addition, while the study finds no evidence that the regulatory reviewers’ workload compression influences the general relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk, it documents that low (high) regulatory reviewers’ workload compression weakens (strengthens) both the relationships stated above.,Collectively, the results suggest that the agency conflicts/corporate governance quality and regulatory reviewers’ workload compression are important factors in the analysis of the relationship between the CEO ability and regulatory review risk. The results offer insights into the opposing theoretical viewpoints about the relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk. Thus, the results will be of interest to boards of directors and other stakeholders involved in the regulatory review process.

中文翻译：

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首席执行官能力和监管审查风险

首席执行官（CEO）的能力可能会影响各种公司的报告决策，因此，CEO的能力会受到监管审核者的审查。但是，理论文献提供了关于首席执行官能力如何影响监管审查风险的混合证据。因此，本研究旨在实证研究CEO能力对监管审查风险的影响。为了衡量CEO能力，本研究使用了Demerjian等人开发的CEO能力得分。（2012）。此外，为了衡量监管审查风险，该研究使用了从伊朗证券交易组织收到评论信的可能性。该研究发现，首席执行官能力与监管审查风险之间的关系通常为负数，具有统计意义，但在经济上并不重要重要的，即 关系很小。在这方面，研究表明这种关系是消极的，并且对于代理冲突程度低，公司治理质量高的公司在统计和经济上也很重要。对于具有高水平代理冲突和低水平公司治理质量的公司，这是积极的，并且在统计和经济上也很重要。此外，尽管该研究没有发现证据表明监管审查员的工作量压缩会影响首席执行官能力与监管审查风险之间的一般关系，但它证明，低（高）监管审查员的工作量压缩会削弱（加强）上述两种关系。集体地 结果表明，在分析首席执行官能力与监管审查风险之间的关系时，机构冲突/企业治理质量和监管审查员的工作量压缩是重要因素。结果为有关首席执行官能力与监管审查风险之间关系的相反理论观点提供了见解。因此，结果将对参与监管审查过程的董事会和其他利益相关方有利。