Recent studies regarding auditor experience generally focus on auditor overall experience in accounting, auditing, finance and related fields (Hardies et al., 2014), auditor sector and domain experience (Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Hammersley, 2006), auditor experience as CPA (Ye et al., 2014; Sonu et al., 2016) or big N experience (Chi and Huang, 2005; Gul et al., 2013; Zimmerman, 2016) or auditors’ international working experience (Chen et al., 2017). But there is little attention paid to where auditors obtained their experience from? And how do auditors with government experience affect audit quality (AQ)? This paper aims to present the effect of auditors with government experience on AQ.,The authors used Turkish publicly traded firms in Borsa Istanbul between the year 2008 and 2015 to test the hypothesis. The sample comprises 1,067 observations and eight years. Two main proxies of government experience are used in this paper. The first proxy is auditor’s government experience in the past. The second proxy is the continuous variable which is “the logarithmic value of the number of years of government experience”. Further, auditor overall experience in auditing, accounting, finance and other related fields are also used as a control variable. Audit reporting aggressiveness, audit reporting lag and discretionary accruals are used as proxies of AQ. Besides this, the authors adopted the model to estimate the probability of selecting a government-experienced auditor, and they presented the regression results with the addition of inverse Mills ratio.,The main findings are consistent with conjecture. Government-experienced auditors do not enhance AQ. They are aggressive, and they complete audit work slowly and they cannot detect discretionary accruals effectively. Spending more time in a government agency makes them more aggressive and slow, and they do not detect earnings management practices. The Heckman estimation results regarding the variable of interest are also consistent with the main estimation results. In addition, the authors found in predicting government-experienced auditor choice that family firms, domestic firms and firms that reported losses (larger firms, older firms) are more (less) likely to choose government-experienced auditors.,This study has some limitations. The authors used a small sample to test the impact of government-experienced auditors on AQ because of data access problems. Much data used in this study were collected manually. Earnings quality was calculated using only discretionary accruals. Real activities manipulation was not used as the proxy of AQ in this paper. The findings from emerging markets might not generalize to the developed countries because the Turkish audit market is developing compared to Continental Europe or USA.,The findings are considered for independent audit firms. Audit firms may employ new graduates and train them to offer more qualified audit work for their clients. The results do not mean that government-experienced auditors should not work in an audit firm, or that they should not establish an audit firm. It is clear that government-experienced auditors provide low AQ in terms of audit reporting aggressiveness, audit report lag and discretionary accruals. But as they operate more in the independent audit sector, they will become successful and provide qualified audit work. One other thing we can say is that it is perhaps better for government-experienced auditors to work in the tax department of independent audit firms.,This paper tries to fill the gap in the literature regarding the effect of auditor experience on AQ and concentrates on a different type of experience: Auditors with government experience.

中文翻译：

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有政府经验的审计师会降低审计质量吗？

最近有关审计师经验的研究通常集中在审计师在会计，审计，财务及相关领域的整体经验（Hardies等，2014），审计师行业和领域经验（Bedard和Biggs，1991； Hammersley，2006），注册会计师的审计师经验。 （Ye等人，2014; Sonu等人，2016）或具有丰富的N经验（Chi and Huang，2005; Gul等人，2013; Zimmerman，2016）或审计师的国际工作经验（Chen等人，2017） ）。但是，很少关注审计师从何处获得经验？具有政府经验的审计师如何影响审计质量（AQ）？本文旨在介绍具有政府经验的审计师对AQ的影响。作者使用2008年至2015年在伊斯坦布尔证券交易所的土耳其公开交易公司来检验该假设。样本包括1 067观察和八年。本文使用了两个主要的政府经验代理。第一位代理人是审计师过去的政府经验。第二个代理是连续变量，它是“政府经验年数的对数值”。此外，审计师在审计，会计，财务和其他相关领域的整体经验也被用作控制变量。审计报告的进取性，审计报告的滞后和应计的应计费用均用作AQ的代理。除此之外，作者采用该模型来估计选择政府经验丰富的审计师的可能性，并在增加了逆米尔斯比率的基础上给出了回归结果。主要发现与猜想是一致的。具有政府经验的审计师不会提高AQ。他们好斗 并且他们缓慢地完成了审计工作，并且他们无法有效地检测可自由支配的应计项目。在政府机构中花费更多的时间会使他们变得更加激进和缓慢，并且他们没有发现盈余管理实践。有关关注变量的Heckman估计结果也与主要估计结果一致。此外，作者在预测政府经验丰富的审计师的选择时发现，家族企业，国内企业和报告亏损的企业（较大的企业，较老的企业）更有可能（较少）选择政府经验丰富的审计师。 。作者使用一个小样本来测试由于数据访问问题而有政府经验的审计师对AQ的影响。本研究中使用的许多数据都是手动收集的。收入质量仅使用可自由支配的权责发生制来计算。在本文中，没有使用真实活动操纵作为AQ的代理。新兴市场的调查结果可能不会推广到发达国家，因为与欧洲大陆或美国相比，土耳其的审计市场正在发展。审计事务所可能会雇用新的毕业生，并培训他们为客户提供更多合格的审计工作。结果并不意味着有政府经验的审计师不应该在审计事务所工作，或者不应该建立审计事务所。显然，有政府经验的审计师在审计报告积极性，审计报告滞后和可自由支配应计项目方面提供较低的AQ。但是，随着他们在独立审计部门中开展更多业务，他们将成功并提供合格的审核工作。我们可以说的另一件事是，由政府经验丰富的审计师在独立审计公司的税务部门工作可能会更好。本文试图填补有关审计师经验对AQ的影响的文献空白，并着重于另一种经验类型：具有政府经验的审计师。