How much should society be willing to pay for reducing inequality? The standard approach to this normative question relates inequality aversion to risk aversion by treating inequality as an outcome of a lottery. However, in the presence of heterogeneous risk preferences, it is unclear whose preferences should be used for evaluating this lottery. This paper derives a social welfare function as a limit of an iterative procedure, in which each iteration constructs a lottery based on the certainty equivalents from the previous iteration. The limit of this procedure can be interpreted as the equally distributed equivalent of the initial allocation.

中文翻译：

---

具有异质风险偏好的福利分析

社会应该愿意为减少不平等付出多少？解决这个规范性问题的标准方法是将不平等视为彩票的结果，从而将不平等厌恶与风险厌恶联系起来。然而，在存在异质风险偏好的情况下，不清楚应该使用谁的偏好来评估这种彩票。本文推导出一个社会福利函数作为迭代过程的限制，其中每次迭代都基于前一次迭代的确定性等价物构造一个彩票。此过程的限制可以解释为初始分配的等价分布。