This paper provides a nonparametric identification result for procurement models with asymmetric bidders, dependent private information, and interdependent costs. For risk-neutral bidders, the model’s payoff-relevant primitives are the joint distribution of private information and each bidder’s full-information expected cost. The joint distribution of bids identifies the joint distribution of signals. First-order conditions identify the expected cost conditional on tying with at least one competitor for the lowest bid. I show identification of each bidder’s full-information cost, using variation in competitors’ cost shifters that are excludable from bidders’ own full-information costs, and generate variation in the set of competitors’ signals that induce a tie for the lowest bid. I estimate the relevant payoff primitives using data from Michigan highway procurements and evaluate policies that affect the winner’s curse’s severity.

中文翻译：

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具有相互依赖成本的拍卖模型中的识别

本文为具有非对称投标人、依赖私人信息和相互依赖的成本的采购模型提供了非参数识别结果。对于风险中性投标人，该模型的收益相关原语是私人信息的联合分布和每个投标人的全信息预期成本。投标的联合分布标识了信号的联合分布。一阶条件确定预期成本，条件是与至少一个竞争者的最低出价挂钩。我展示了每个投标人的全信息成本的识别，使用竞争对手的成本转移变量的变化，这些变化可以从投标人自己的全信息成本中排除，并产生导致最低出价平局的竞争者信号集的变化。