The purpose of the study is to explore empirically the consequences of knowledge hiding at the individual level and from the knowledge hiding committers' perspective. Hence, in line with agency theory and prior literature on knowledge hiding, the study investigates the associations between different facets of knowledge hiding and individual-level job performance, as well as the mediating role of employee well-being in the associations.,Structural equation modeling was used to analyze multisource survey data from a sample of 214 employees and 34 immediate supervisors, in a professional services company in Finland.,Evasive hiding was found to be negatively associated with in-role job performance and positively associated with innovative job performance. Playing dumb was found to be positively associated with in-role job performance. Finally, even though the association between rationalized hiding and innovative job performance was found to be positive, it was found to be of a smaller magnitude when employee well-being was taken into account.,Forceful unhealthy competition and exploitative and workaholic cultures are discussed to reduce knowledge hiding behavior among employees and their negative consequences.,The study highlights the paradox of managing organizational knowledge. In line with agency theory, we advocate that while knowledge sharing is one of the major assets of organizational welfare from the organizational perspective, it may resonate with the employee's perspective. Consequently, unless employees' self-interest and organizational interests are aligned, the paradox of managing organizational knowledge arises, and the classic agency problem occurs.

中文翻译：

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探索知识隐藏的后果：代理理论的视角

该研究的目的是从个人和知识隐藏提交者的角度经验性地探索知识隐藏的后果。因此，根据代理理论和有关知识隐藏的现有文献，本研究调查了知识隐藏的各个方面与个人级别的工作绩效之间的关联，以及员工幸福感在关联中的中介作用。建模被用来分析来自芬兰一家专业服务公司的214名员工和34名直属上司的多源调查数据。发现躲躲躲藏与角色内工作绩效负相关，而与创新工作绩效正相关。研究发现，玩哑巴与角色内的工作表现成正相关。最后，即使发现合理的隐藏和创新的工作绩效之间的关联是积极的，但考虑到员工的福祉，发现关联的程度较小。为了避免减少知识，人们讨论了有力的不健康竞争以及剥削性和工作狂文化该研究突出了管理组织知识的悖论。根据代理理论，我们主张，尽管从组织的角度来看，知识共享是组织福利的主要资产之一，但它可能会与员工的观点产生共鸣。因此，除非员工的自我利益和组织利益协调一致，否则就会出现管理组织知识的悖论，并且会发生经典的代理问题。