Purpose – This paper examines the international R&D contest in which the extent of intellectual property right (IPR) affects both the size of prize for the winning firm and the extent of positive spillover through cost of firms. Recognizing the possibility of incomplete protection of IPR, the present paper analyzes the effect of changes in the extent of IPR on payoffs to firms and social welfare. Design/methodology – This paper examines coordination of IPRs by countries in economic integration. The paper then develops a general model of international R&D contest with incomplete protection of IPR. An increase in the extent of IPR augments the share of the prize the winning firm can appropriate, while decreasing the positive cost externality. To derive sharper results, the paper considers the cases of linear and fixed spillovers. Findings – Under plausible assumptions, an increase in the IPR augments the payoff to each firm and the aggregate payoffs as well. The paper also shows that the number of firms participating in the R&D contest can be endogenously determined in the two-stage R&D contest. The higher the extent of cost spillover, and the larger the effective prize, the more firms participate in the international R&D contest. Originality/value – Existing studies assume that firms winning the R&D contest enjoy perfect IPR to the output of their R&D activities. This is a very restrictive assumption in that other firms can copy the new products or processes. By allowing for the incompleteness of the IPR, the present paper develops a more realistic model of R&D contest. The novelty of the present paper is to allow for the possibility that the higher extent of IPR increases the prize and decreases positive cost externality at the same time. The findings of the present paper can serve as a basis for government policy toward R&D activities of firms and protection of IPRs.

中文翻译：

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具有知识产权协调和成本外部性的国际研发竞赛

目的–本文探讨了国际R＆D竞赛，其中知识产权的范围（IPR）既影响获胜公司的奖励规模，又影响通过公司成本产生的正溢出效应。认识到不完全保护知识产权的可能性，本文分析了知识产权范围变化对企业收益和社会福利的影响。设计/方法论–本文研究了国家在经济一体化中对知识产权的协调。然后，本文建立了不完全保护知识产权的国际研发竞赛的一般模型。知识产权范围的增加增加了获胜公司可以使用的奖品份额，同时减少了积极的成本外部性。为了获得更清晰的结果，本文考虑了线性和固定溢出的情况。调查结果–在合理的假设下，知识产权的增加会增加每个公司的收益以及总收益。本文还表明，可以在两阶段的研发竞赛中内生地确定参加研发竞赛的公司数量。成本溢出的程度越高，有效奖赏越大，参加国际R＆D竞赛的公司就越多。独创性/价值–现有研究假设赢得R＆D竞赛的公司在其R＆D活动的输出中享有完美的知识产权。这是一个非常严格的假设，因为其他公司可以复制新产品或新流程。通过考虑到知识产权的不完整性，本文建立了更为现实的研发竞赛模型。本文的新颖性是为了允许以下可能性：较高程度的IPR会增加奖励，同时减少正成本外部性。本文的研究结果可作为政府针对企业研发活动和知识产权保护政策的基础。