We analyze late-career teacher turnover induced by pension incentives. Using longitudinal data with performance measures for Tennessee public school teachers, we find higher quality teachers are less likely to retire conditional on age and experience. To quantify the effects of pension incentives, we estimate a structural model for retirement and find that high quality teachers have a lower disutility for teaching relative to retirement. We use the structural estimates to simulate the effect of changes in retirement incentives. Enhancements to traditional plans accelerate teacher retirement, whereas targeted retention bonuses delay retirement and retain high quality teachers at relatively modest cost.

中文翻译：

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教师养老金计划激励、退休决定和劳动力质量

我们分析了养老金激励措施导致的职业后期教师流失。使用田纳西州公立学校教师绩效指标的纵向数据，我们发现较高质量的教师不太可能因年龄和经验而退休。为了量化养老金激励的影响，我们估计了退休的结构模型，发现与退休相比，高素质的教师对教学的不利影响较小。我们使用结构估计来模拟退休激励措施变化的影响。对传统计划的改进加速了教师退休，而有针对性的保留奖金则延迟了退休并以相对适中的成本留住了高质量的教师。