A new public project usually provides economic benefits to property owners. In general, a delay caused by a government budget shortage proportionally reduces the future cash flow of the private developer potentially benefitted from a new public project. Based on that eventuality, this study examines a mechanism of willingness to pay, which asks private developers to voluntarily participate in sharing the budget shortage. This participation process is investigated by applying system dynamics, which demonstrate several causal loops, such as between the delay cause and the reaction of the private developer. In spite of difficulty in predicting the actual effect of this idea due to its conceptual origin, this innovative approach can contribute to real-world exigencies in two ways: the provision of background for research on the on-time completion of public projects via private developer cost-sharing participation and the illustration of an alternative that minimizes private developers’ future revenue deduction caused by delays. First published online 23 June 2020

中文翻译：

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特殊评估区情况下的酬金支付机制动力学建模

一个新的公共项目通常会为业主带来经济利益。一般而言，政府预算短缺导致的延迟会相应地减少潜在受益于新公共项目的私人开发商的未来现金流量。基于这种可能性，本研究考察了支付意愿的机制，该机制要求私人开发商自愿参与分担预算短缺。通过应用系统动力学来研究此参与过程，该过程演示了多个因果循环，例如延迟原因与私人开发商的反应之间。尽管由于其概念起源而难以预测此想法的实际效果，但是这种创新方法可以通过两种方式促进现实世界的紧急状态：通过私人开发商分摊费用参与为公共项目的按时完成研究提供背景资料，并举例说明一种替代方案，以最大程度地减少私人开发商因延误而导致的未来收入减少。首次在线发布于2020年6月23日