Abstract This paper advances an approach to presupposition rooted in the concept of commitment, a dialectical notion weaker than truth and belief. It investigates ancient medieval dialectical theories and develops the insights thereof for analyzing how presuppositions are evaluated and why a proposition is presupposed. In particular, at a pragmatic level, presuppositions are reconstructed as the conclusions of implicit arguments from presumptive reasoning, grounded on presumptions of different type and nature. A false (or rather unaccepted) presupposition can be thus represented as the outcome of a conflict of presumptions – the ones used by the speaker and the ones commonly accepted or backed by evidence. From an interpretative perspective, this defaulted presumptive reasoning can be explained by comparing the available presumptions and repaired by replacing the weaker and unacceptable ones.

中文翻译：

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预设的辩证法

摘要本文提出了一种基于承诺概念的前提预设方法，承诺概念是一种弱于真理和信念的辩证概念。它研究了古代中世纪的辩证法理论，并发展了其见解，以分析如何评估预设，以及为何预设一个预设。尤其是，在语用层面上，前提是根据不同类型和性质的前提从前提推理中隐含论证的结论而重构的。错误的（或者说是不被接受的）预设因此可以被表示为假设冲突的结果-这些假设是说话人所使用的前提，以及通常被证据接受或支持的证据。从解释的角度来看，