Purpose The purpose of this paper is to argue that: in a context of global labour market competition and in the absence of new strategic repertoires, class trade unions are progressively becoming “managers of precariousness”. Thus, the paper challenges the compromise logic as the unique solution to corporate threats to relocation, since it undermines trade union power resources, mainly discursively and organisationally, and hinders trade union capacity to transform the balance of forces to their favour later, when the hegemonic discourse can more easily be challenged in periods of crisis. Design/methodology/approach The paper draws upon the doctoral fieldwork the author undertook in the city and province of Barcelona during Spring–Summer 2015. More than 30 semi-structured interviews to various union delegates and regional metal officials have been accompanied by an exhaustive review of primary and secondary documentation. In so doing, this paper gives a rich and nuanced account on the different “world-views” and strategies that union delegates pursue when bargaining against transnational corporations. Findings This paper shows how the conservative position that Spanish trade unions adopted to the 2008 financial crisis in the automotive industry is path-dependent to dynamics established during the 1990s when lean production techniques were implemented in exchange for higher salaries. It draws upon the collective bargaining history of the Nissan–Zona–Franca assembly factory in the outskirts of Barcelona to, crucially, explain how signing micro-corporatist pacts and portraying them as the unique solution to corporate threats to relocation undermines trade union power resources, and has two important drawbacks: that micro-corporatist pacts only postpone the recurring threat to relocation to the future by eroding, not improving, the conditions of the workforce, accepting corporate discourse erodes the solidarity among workers, and it also allows yellow unions to displace class unions. Originality/value This paper enriches and updates the literature on micro-corporatism, collective bargaining in transnational corporations, and the erosion of trade union power resources which dates back to the 1990s and early 2000s. Whilst the negative aspects that competitiveness pacts have on workers’ salaries and conditions have been widely reported, this paper provides a rich and updated explanation of how such pacts have negative repercussions on the discursive and organisational power resources that unions have at the workplace level. In that sense, the originality of this paper rests on engaging into a substantiated historical analysis on how trade unions change throughout time as a result, at least partially, of their own strategic choices. Moreover, this paper clearly shows that concessionary positions towards collective bargaining are self-undermining.

中文翻译：

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工会是“不稳定的管理者”

目的本文的目的是争论：在全球劳动力市场竞争的背景下，在没有新的战略资源的情况下，阶级工会正逐渐成为“ pre可危的管理者”。因此，本文对折衷逻辑提出挑战，认为它是解决公司搬迁威胁的唯一解决方案，因为它破坏了工会权力资源（主要是在话语上和组织上），并阻碍了工会在霸权主义之后将力量平衡转变为对他们有利的能力。在危机时期，话语更容易受到挑战。设计/方法论/方法本文借鉴了作者在2015年春季至夏季在巴塞罗那市和省进行的博士田野调查。在对工会代表和地区金属官员进行的30多次半结构式采访的同时，还对主要和辅助文档进行了详尽的审查。在此过程中，本文对工会代表在与跨国公司讨价还价时所追求的不同“世界观”和策略进行了详尽而细致的阐述。调查结果本文显示了西班牙工会在2008年汽车行业金融危机中所采取的保守立场，在很大程度上取决于1990年代建立的动态，当时实施了精益生产技术以换取更高的薪水。它借鉴了巴塞罗那郊区日产–佐纳–弗兰卡组装工厂的集体谈判历史，最重要的是，解释签署微型公司协议并将其描述为解决公司搬迁威胁的独特解决方案如何破坏工会权力资源的问题，并且有两个重要的缺点：微型公司协议仅通过侵蚀而不是将重新出现的未来迁移威胁推迟到未来，而没有改善劳动条件，接受公司话语会侵蚀工人之间的团结，这也使黄色工会取代了阶级工会。原创性/价值本文丰富并更新了有关微观公司主义，跨国公司的集体谈判以及可追溯到1990年代和2000年代初期的工会权力资源的文献。尽管已经广泛报道了竞争协定对工人的工资和条件的不利影响，本文对此类协议如何对工会在工作场所一级的话语权和组织权资源产生负面影响提供了丰富而更新的解释。从这种意义上讲，本文的独创性在于对工会如何至少由于其自身的战略选择而在一段时间内变化的事实进行深入的历史分析。而且，本文清楚地表明，集体谈判的优惠立场是自欺欺人的。自己的战略选择。而且，本文清楚地表明，集体谈判的优惠立场是自欺欺人的。自己的战略选择。而且，本文清楚地表明，集体谈判的优惠立场是自欺欺人的。