This paper applies game theory and expected utility theory models to study the optimal public–private partnerships (PPPs) in disaster preparedness considering the uncertain consequences of the disasters, the investment costs, and the private sector’s potential risk attitudes, including risk-seeking behavior, risk aversion, and risk neutrality. We study the private sector’s best response and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solutions. Our results show that the public sector provides the least amount of subsidy to the risk-averse private sector and the highest amount of subsidy to the risk-seeking private sector. On the contrary, the risk-averse private sector invests the most, and the risk-seeking private sector invests the least. Finally, we validate the model results using a two-stage experiment with 91 participants. This paper provides insights into how to construct win–win PPPs in disaster preparedness with considerations of the private sector’s risk behavior.

中文翻译：

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建模和验证灾害管理中的公私伙伴关系

本文运用博弈论和期望效用理论模型研究了灾难的不确定后果，投资成本以及私营部门的潜在风险态度（包括风险），从而在灾害准备中研究了最佳的公共-私人伙伴关系（PPP）。 -寻求行为，规避风险和风险中立。我们研究了私营部门的最佳响应和子博弈完美的纳什均衡解决方案。我们的结果表明，公共部门向规避风险的私营部门提供的补贴最少，而对寻求风险的私营部门的补贴则最多。相反，规避风险的私营部门投资最多，而寻求风险的私营部门投资最少。最后，我们使用91名参与者的两阶段实验验证了模型结果。