This paper analyses the efficiency of the Texas shootout and ½-auction partnership dissolution mechanisms when one of the partners has a chance to learn the other partner’s valuation. It shows that the efficiency of the Texas shootout mechanism positively depends on the probability of one partner successfully learning the other’s valuation while for the ½-auction mechanism such a relationship is not monotonic: The outcome is efficient when the probability of observing the other partner’s signal is zero or one, but is inefficient for all intermediate values.

中文翻译：

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合作关系解散：信息与效率

本文分析了其中一个合伙人有机会了解另一个合伙人的估值时，德克萨斯州枪战和1/2拍卖合伙人解散机制的效率。它表明，德州枪战机制的效率正好取决于一个伙伴成功学习另一方估值的可能性，而对于½拍卖机制而言，这种关系不是单调的：当观察另一伙伴信号的可能性时，结果是有效的为零或一，但对于所有中间值而言效率不高。