This article examines the role of espionage in defending against cyber attacks on infrastructural firms. We analyze the problem using a game between a government, an infrastructural firm, and an attacker. If the attacker successfully breaches the IT security defenses of the infrastructural firm, primary losses accrue to that firm, while widespread collateral losses accrue to the rest of the economy. The government assists the infrastructural firm by providing intelligence inputs about an impending attack. We find that subject to some conditions, expenditure on intelligence adds value only when its amount exceeds a threshold level. Also, the nature of the equilibrium depends on the level of government expenditure in intelligence. We find that the optimal level of intelligence expenditure can change in seemingly unexpected ways in response to a shift in parameters. For example, reduced vulnerability of the infrastructural firm does not necessarily imply a reduction in intelligence-gathering effort. We also ...

中文翻译：

---

情报输入在防御网络战争和网络恐怖主义中的作用

本文探讨了间谍活动在防御基础设施公司的网络攻击中的作用。我们使用政府，基础设施公司和攻击者之间的博弈分析问题。如果攻击者成功违反了基础设施公司的IT安全防御措施，则该公司将遭受主要损失，而其他经济部门则会遭受广泛的附带损失。政府通过提供有关即将发生的攻击的情报来协助基础设施公司。我们发现，在某些条件下，只有在情报支出超过阈值水平时，情报支出才能增加价值。同样，均衡的性质取决于政府在情报方面的支出水平。我们发现，随着参数的变化，智能支出的最佳水平可能会以看似出乎意料的方式发生变化。例如，基础设施公司脆弱性的降低并不一定意味着情报收集工作的减少。我们也 ...