We describe a framework for analyzing the dynamics of investment, borrowing, and payout decisions by public corporations. We assume that managers act entirely in their own long-run interests, subject to a governance constraint that limits their rents. Risk-neutral managers invest to maximize value but wait too long to disinvest. Efficient disinvestment can be forced by the right level of debt or by takeovers. Risk-averse managers underinvest; they do not waste free cash flow, because the governance constraint is binding. They smooth rents and consequently payout, so that changes in borrowing become a shock absorber for volatility of operating income. We obtain the Lintner model of payout if risk-averse managers have a utility function with habit formation. We show how to adapt the dynamic framework to analyze several other issues, including the effects of asymmetric information. We show that Lintner-style payout smoothing can also arise when risk-neutral managers are better informed than outsiders.

中文翻译：

---

公司财务中的代理机构动态

我们描述了一个分析公共公司投资，借贷和支出决定动态的框架。我们假设管理人员完全出于自己的长远利益行事，受制于限制其租金的治理约束。风险中立的经理进行投资以最大化价值，但等待太久才能撤资。适当的债务水平或收购可以迫使有效的撤资。规避风险的管理者投资不足；他们不会浪费自由现金流，因为治理约束具有约束力。它们使租金平稳，并因此使支出平稳，因此借贷的变化成为营业收入波动的缓冲。如果规避风险的管理者具有养成习惯的效用函数，我们将获得Lintner支付模型。我们展示了如何调整动态框架来分析其他一些问题，包括不对称信息的影响。我们证明，当风险中立的经理比外界人更了解情况时，林特纳式的支出平滑也会出现。