The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo oeconomicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo oeconomicus is favored by evolution only when individuals' preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo oeconomicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, evolution destabilizes Homo oeconomicus in virtually all games.

中文翻译：

---

偏好形成的进化模型

关于战略互动中个人偏好演变的文献非常广泛和多样。我们围绕以下问题组织讨论：假设物质结果驱动进化成功，在什么情况下进化会促进经济人（被定义为物质自身利益），什么时候会导致其他偏好？文献表明，只有当个人的偏好是他们的私人信息并且人口众多且混杂在一起时，经济人才受到进化的青睐，因此具有罕见的突变体偏好的个人几乎永远不会相互交流。如果稀有突变体之间的相互作用更为频繁（例如，由于局部分散），则进化反而会促进某种经济人的泛化，包括对康德人的关注。