We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

中文翻译：

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选民投票率与同伴处罚

我们引入一种模型，在该模型中，竞争性政党从战略上选择投票参与的社会规范，并确定选民的投票率。必须通过昂贵的同伴监视和惩罚来实施社会规范。当执行社会规范的成本很低时，较大的一方总是有优势的。否则，按照奥尔森（Olson，1965）的精神，较小的政党可能会占优势。我们的模型具有道德选民模型的特征，并且提供了新颖且与经验相关的比较静态结果。