I study a mechanism design problem involving a principal and a single, boundedly rational agent. The agent transitions among belief states by combining current beliefs with up to K pieces of information at a time. By expressing a mechanism as a complex contract—a collection of clauses, each providing limited information about the mechanism—the principal manipulates the agent into believing truthful reporting is optimal. I show that such bounded rationality expands the set of implementable functions and that optimal contracts are robust not only to variation in K , but to several plausible variations on the agent's cognitive procedure.

中文翻译：

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复杂合同模型

我研究了涉及主体和单个有限理性主体的机制设计问题。通过将当前信念与一次最多K条信息相结合，Agent在信念状态之间进行转换。通过将机制表示为复杂的合同（条款的集合，每个条款都提供有关该机制的有限信息），委托人操纵代理人以使其相信真实的报告是最佳的。我证明了这种有限的理性扩展了可实现功能的集合，并且最优合同不仅对K的变化具有鲁棒性，而且对代理的认知程序的几个合理的变化也具有鲁棒性。