We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers' gain from becoming informed. When quotes are observable, this effect in turn induces a strategic complementarity in information acquisition amongst market makers. We then derive the equilibrium pattern of information acquisition and examine the implications of our analysis for market liquidity and price discovery. We show that increasing the cost of information can decrease market liquidity and improve price discovery.

中文翻译：

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谁在经销商市场中获取信息？

我们研究经销商市场中的信息获取。我们首先确定信息获取方面的单方面战略互补性：交易者的信息越丰富，做市商从信息中获得的收益就越大。当可以观察到报价时，这种效应反过来会在做市商之间引起信息获取方面的战略互补。然后，我们得出信息获取的均衡模式，并检查分析对市场流动性和价格发现的影响。我们表明，增加信息成本可以减少市场流动性并改善价格发现。