A basic principle of economics is that people always prefer a larger set of opportunities. Money illusion can be considered as the phenomenon when people may not correctly perceive their budget constraints, and may act in ways that run counter to this preference. In this interpretation, money illusion is a cognitive bias, worthwhile to overcome. Herein I argue that taking a view of human decision-making based on certain strands of cognitive psychology, one can reinterpret the evidence for money illusion in two ways. First, I claim that money illusion is inescapable to some extent, and saying that we suffer from it is similar to alleging that we experience optical illusions, only because we are unable to see, say, individual atoms. Second, taking a view on “preferences” different from the traditional one, I contend that it may bring little benefit to get rid of money illusion even in the cases where it is possible to do so. To follow up the visual analogy, even if we can improve our eyesight it is not obviously desirable. These arguments seem to lead to a Candidean disposition: there is no possible improvement on the state of affairs as far as “money illusion” is concerned. Nonetheless, I will make some positive proposals concerning economic policy and economics research.

中文翻译：

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金钱错觉：从认知科学的角度重新考虑

经济学的基本原则是，人们总是喜欢更多的机会。当人们可能没有正确地认识到他们的预算约束，并且可能以与这种偏好背道而驰的方式行动时，金钱幻觉可以被视为一种现象。在这种解释中，金钱错觉是一种认知偏见，值得克服。在本文中，我认为，从基于认知心理学某些方面的人类决策角度来看，可以用两种方式重新解释金钱幻觉的证据。首先，我声称金钱错觉在某种程度上是不可避免的，并且说我们遭受金钱错觉类似于声称我们经历了光学错觉，只是因为我们看不见单个原子。其次，从不同于传统的“偏好”的角度出发，我认为，即使有可能，摆脱金钱幻想也无济于事。跟随视觉类比，即使我们可以改善视力，也显然不是可取的。这些论点似乎导致了Candidean的倾向：就“金钱幻觉”而言，事态没有任何改善。尽管如此，我将对经济政策和经济学研究提出一些积极的建议。