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The Problems and Promise of Entrepreneurial Partnerships: Decision Making, Overconfidence, and Learning in Founding Teams
Academy of Management Review ( IF 19.3 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-07 , DOI: 10.5465/amr.2019.0119
John S Chen 1, 2 , Daniel Walter Elfenbein 3 , Hart E. Posen 4 , Ming zhu Wang 5
Affiliation  

How should decision-making be organized in entrepreneurial teams when founders exhibit confidence biases? New ventures are commonly founded by teams of entrepreneurs, and consequently, they must implicitly or explicitly employ a decision-making structure that defines how individuals’ beliefs are aggregated into team decisions. We consider this issue through the lens of organizational economics that focuses on the design of decision-making governance. Using a computational model, we consider three archetypal decision-making structures: partnership voting, a boss with employees, and a buyout option (partnership convertible to boss structure). We highlight the conditions under which partnership voting is an effective means of governing market entry and exit decisions when teams’ decision making is informed by efforts to learn about the merits of their uncertain opportunities. The promise of partnership voting is realized when entrepreneurs are either unbiased or optimistic about their likelihood of success. Partnership voting is problematic when entrepreneurs differ in their biases or respond too rapidly to new information, in which case a buyout option is better. From a policy perspective, we show that confidence biases may be managed by selectively matching the decision-making structure to entrepreneurs' biases, and that doing so may substantially improve the performance of new ventures.

中文翻译:

创业伙伴关系的问题和承诺:创始团队的决策、过度自信和学习

当创始人表现出信心偏见时,如何在创业团队中组织决策?新企业通常由企业家团队创立,因此,他们必须隐含或明确地采用一种决策结构来定义个人的信念如何聚合到团队决策中。我们通过关注决策治理设计的组织经济学的视角来考虑这个问题。使用计算模型,我们考虑了三种典型的决策结构:合伙投票、老板与员工和买断选项(合伙可转换为老板结构)。当团队的决策通过努力了解其不确定机会的优点时,我们强调合作伙伴投票是管理市场进入和退出决策的有效手段的条件。当企业家对他们成功的可能性保持公正或乐观时,合伙投票的承诺就会实现。当企业家的偏见不同或对新信息反应太快时,合伙投票就会出现问题,在这种情况下,买断选项更好。从政策的角度来看,我们表明可以通过选择性地将决策结构与企业家的偏见相匹配来管理信心偏见,并且这样做可以大大提高新企业的绩效。当企业家对他们成功的可能性保持公正或乐观时,合伙投票的承诺就会实现。当企业家的偏见不同或对新信息反应太快时,合伙投票就会出现问题,在这种情况下,买断选项更好。从政策的角度来看,我们表明可以通过选择性地将决策结构与企业家的偏见相匹配来管理信心偏见,并且这样做可以大大提高新企业的绩效。当企业家对他们成功的可能性保持公正或乐观时,合伙投票的承诺就会实现。当企业家的偏见不同或对新信息反应太快时,合伙投票就会出现问题,在这种情况下,买断选项更好。从政策的角度来看,我们表明可以通过选择性地将决策结构与企业家的偏见相匹配来管理信心偏见,并且这样做可以大大提高新企业的绩效。
更新日期:2020-05-07
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