This paper studies the influence of executive verbal communication on the convergence of investors’ opinions, defined as reduction of differences in investors’ valuations. Building on the corporate communication and sensegiving literatures, we argue that executive verbal communication impacts investor opinion convergence through its influence not only on disclosure of new information, but also on the comprehensibility and credibility of the information conveyed. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the newness, simplicity, and unscriptedness of executive verbal communication are all positively associated with investor opinion convergence. We also argue that the effect of executive communication on investor opinion convergence will be amplified when investors have a greater demand for information as would be the case for those firms with higher earnings uncertainty. Using a unique research design and second-by-second intraday stock trading data from 10,415 conference calls of 847 publicly listed firms between 2002 and 2012, we found strong support for our predictions.

中文翻译：

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高管口头沟通对投资者意见趋同的影响

本文研究高管口头沟通对投资者意见趋同的影响，定义为减少投资者估值差异。基于企业沟通和意义的文献，我们认为高管口头沟通不仅通过对新信息披露的影响，而且通过对所传达信息的可理解性和可信度的影响来影响投资者意见趋同。因此，我们假设高管口头交流的新颖性、简单性和无脚本化都与投资者意见趋同呈正相关。我们还认为，当投资者对信息有更大的需求时，高管沟通对投资者意见趋同的影响将被放大，就像那些盈利不确定性更高的公司一样。使用独特的研究设计和来自 2002 年至 2012 年间 847 家上市公司的 10,415 次电话会议的逐秒日内股票交易数据，我们发现我们的预测得到了强有力的支持。