We propose a new game to strategically justify the constrained equal awards rule in claims problems. Our game is “procedurally fair” (claimants are treated equally) and “multilateral” (all claimants negotiate simultaneously). In addition, even if claimants cannot reach an agreement in any period, they can renegotiate in the next period. We show that, for each claims problem, the awards vector chosen by the constrained equal awards rule achieved at period 1 is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game.

中文翻译：

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通过程序上公平的多边讨价还价博弈，对有约束力的平等裁决规则进行战略辩护

我们提出了一种新的游戏，以战略性地证明索赔问题中的约束相等奖励规则。我们的博弈是“程序上公平的”（对索赔人一视同仁）和“多边的”（所有索赔人同时进行谈判）。此外，即使索赔人在任何时期都无法达成协议，他们也可以在下一个时期重新谈判。我们证明，对于每个索赔问题，在期间1达到的约束相等奖励规则选择的奖励向量是博弈的唯一子博弈完美均衡结果。