We explore how risk preferences affect pro-social behavior under uncertainty. We analyze a modified dictator game in which the dictator can, by reducing her own sure payoff, increase the odds that an unknown recipient wins a lottery. We first augment a standard social preferences model with reference-dependent risk attitudes and then test the model’s predictions for the dictator’s giving behavior using a laboratory experiment. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that the relationship between giving behavior and a giver’s loss aversion is mediated by the strength of the giver’s pro-social preferences. Among more (less) pro-social dictators, an increase in loss aversion increases (decreases) the likelihood that a dictator contributes to a recipient.

我们探索在不确定性下风险偏好如何影响亲社会行为。我们分析改良的独裁者游戏，在该游戏中，独裁者可以通过减少自己的确定收益来增加未知接收者赢得彩票的几率。我们首先使用依赖参考的风险态度来增强标准的社会偏好模型，然后使用实验室实验测试该模型对独裁者给予行为的预测。与模型的预测一致，我们发现给予行为与给予者的损失厌恶之间的关系是由给予者亲社会偏好的强度来调节的。在更多（较少）亲社会独裁者中，损失规避的增加会增加（减少）独裁者对受助者做出贡献的可能性。