The article seeks to reclaim a type of fear lost in silent omission in education, yet central to the development of an ethical subject. It distinguishes the fear described by Martin Heidegger through the concept of befindlichkeit and fear for the other as an essential moment for ethics articulated by Emmanuel Levinas. It argues that the latter conception of fear has inverted the traditional assumption of the ideal ethical subject as fearless. It then examines how Levinas’s interpretation of fear might contribute to the discussion on fear and responsibility in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It concludes that fear for the other reveals our tremendous capacity to suffer for the other, which is an aspect of the emotional life that has not been identified in the general educational discourse. This inattention manifests itself as a categorical omission in which the existence of fear for the other is not recognized and impedes the ability of educators to address ethics as it is deeply lived.

中文翻译：

---

可怕的伦理主题：大流行中的对他人的恐惧、道德教育和列维纳斯

这篇文章试图找回一种因教育中的无声遗漏而失去的恐惧，但对道德学科的发展却至关重要。它区分了马丁·海德格尔 (Martin Heidegger) 通过 befindlichkeit 概念描述的恐惧和对他人的恐惧，将其作为 Emmanuel Levinas 阐明的伦理的重要时刻。它认为后一种恐惧概念颠覆了理想伦理主体无所畏惧的传统假设。然后，它研究了 Levinas 对恐惧的解释如何有助于在 COVID-19 大流行的背景下讨论恐惧和责任。它得出的结论是，对他人的恐惧揭示了我们为他人受苦的巨大能力，这是一般教育话语中尚未确定的情感生活的一个方面。