To facilitate the energy transition, regulators can choose between several policy options to stimulate energy-efficient design by firms. One possibility is to target firms directly through standards or subsidies. Alternatively, it is possible to influence firms indirectly by targeting firms’ stakeholders and raising consumer awareness through information campaigns and education. In this paper, we focus specifically on the pivotal role of consumers and we investigate the effectiveness of subsidies, product standards, and education in improving firms’ environmental performance through energy-efficient product design. In particular, we investigate the importance of the interaction effect between the regulation and consumers’ environmental awareness under different market structures. We find that a policy based on a product standard can counteract the negative effects of crowding-out consumers’ intrinsic motivation in a monopoly setting, although this counteracting effect is less powerful under a duopoly. However, a subsidy does not provide such a backup system and the full effect of crowding-out will be visible.

为了促进能源过渡，监管机构可以在几种政策选择之间进行选择，以刺激企业进行节能设计。一种可能性是直接通过标准或补贴来瞄准公司。另外，有可能通过针对公司的利益相关者并通过信息宣传和教育提高消费者的意识来间接影响公司。在本文中，我们特别关注消费者的关键作用，我们研究了补贴，产品标准和教育对通过节能产品设计改善企业环境绩效的有效性。特别是，我们研究了在不同市场结构下，法规与消费者的环境意识之间的相互作用的重要性。我们发现，基于产品标准的政策可以抵消垄断环境中挤出消费者内在动机的负面影响，尽管这种抵消作用在双头垄断下作用不大。但是，补贴没有提供这样的备用系统，而且可以看到挤出效应的全部效果。