An outside innovator invents a new product the viability of which is uncertain. The production technology is licensed to a number (strategic choice) of risk-averse potential Cournot producers by means of: an up-front fee, a per-unit royalty, an ad valorem royalty, or a two-part tariff. The incentive to innovate is maximized with a pure up-front fee if potential producers are (or are close to) risk neutral. Otherwise, it is maximized with a combination of up-front fee and ad valorem royalty. Any scheme that contains a royalty component (per-unit or ad valorem) maximizes the innovation diffusion. Irrespective of the magnitude of licensees’ risk aversion, the innovator and consumers are better off, but licensees are worse off with schemes that have an ad valorem royalty component than with a per-unit royalty component. Consumers are best off with pure up-front fee that avoids double marginalization, even though the innovator optimally sells only one license and creates a monopoly. The results remain similar for a risk-averse innovator, but change considerably with a producing innovator.

外部创新者发明了一种不确定性的新产品。该生产技术已通过多种方式（战略选择）许可给具有潜在风险的古诺生产商，这些方式包括：前期费用，每单位专利权使用费，从价专利权使用费或两部分关税。如果潜在的生产者（或接近于）风险中立，则可以通过纯前期费用最大化创新的动力。否则，它会结合前期费用和从价使用费最大化。包含特许权使用费（按单位或从价计算）的任何方案都可以最大程度地扩大创新的传播。不管被许可人规避风险的程度如何，创新者和消费者的情况都会好些，但具有从价使用费部分的计划而不是按单位使用费部分的计划，被许可人的情况会更糟。即使创新者最佳地只出售一个许可证并形成垄断，消费者也可以享受纯净的前期费用，从而避免双重边缘化，这是最好的选择。对于规避风险的创新者而言，结果仍然相似，但是对于生产型创新者而言，其变化很大。