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Constitutional political economy: Ulysses and the prophet Jonah
Public Choice ( IF 1.6 ) Pub Date : 2020-11-25 , DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00865-8
Arye L. Hillman

The story of Ulysses and the sirens has been used to portray the theme of the field of constitutional political economy. Indeed, Ulysses adorns the cover of the field’s journal. I compare Ulysses and the prophet Jonah as constitutional allegories. The behavior of Ulysses does not transfigure to a constitution consistent with public-choice premises, while the behavior of Jonah does. A constitution transfigured from Ulysses provides privileged personal benefits for an autocratic ruler at the expense of social costs that historically often have entailed much more than placing wax in sailors’ ears. A constitution transfigured from Jonah requires leaders and politicians to exit government when the social cost from them staying on exceeds whatever social benefits their continuation in office may provide.

中文翻译:

立宪政治经济学:尤利西斯和先知约拿

尤利西斯和塞壬的故事被用来描绘宪政政治经济学领域的主题。事实上,尤利西斯装饰了该领域期刊的封面。我将尤利西斯和先知约拿比作宪法寓言。尤利西斯的行为并没有转变为符合公共选择前提的宪法,而约拿的行为则相反。从《尤利西斯》改造而来的宪法以牺牲社会成本为代价,为专制统治者提供了特权的个人利益,这在历史上往往比在水手的耳朵里放蜡要多得多。约拿改造的宪法要求领导人和政治家在他们继续任职的社会成本超过他们继续任职可能提供的任何社会利益时退出政府。
更新日期:2020-11-25
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