The place of the concept of response strength in a natural science of behavior has been the subject of much debate. This article reconsiders the concept of response strength for reasons linked to the foundations of a natural science of behavior. The notion of response strength is implicit in many radical behaviorists’ work. Palmer (2009) makes it explicit by applying the response strength concept to three levels: (1) overt behavior, (2) covert behavior, and (3) latent or potential behavior. We argue that the concept of response strength is superfluous in general, and an explication of the notion of giving causal status to nonobservable events like latent behavior or response strength is harmful to a scientific endeavor. Interpreting EEG recordings as indicators of changes in response strength runs the risk of reducing behavior to underlying mechanisms, regardless of whether such suggestions are accompanied by behavioral observations. Many radical behaviorists understand behavior as a discrete unit, inviting conceptual mistakes reflected in the notion of response strength. A molar view is suggested as an alternative that accounts for the temporally extended nature of behavior and avoids the perils of a response-strength based approach.

中文翻译：

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论行为的“力量”


反应强度概念在行为自然科学中的地位一直是很多争论的话题。本文出于与行为自然科学基础相关的原因重新考虑了反应强度的概念。反应强度的概念隐含在许多激进行为主义者的著作中。 Palmer（2009）通过将响应强度概念应用到三个层次来明确这一点：（1）显性行为，（2）隐性行为，以及（3）潜在或潜在行为。我们认为，反应强度的概念一般来说是多余的，对潜在行为或反应强度等不可观察事件赋予因果地位的概念的解释对科学事业是有害的。将脑电图记录解释为反应强度变化的指标，存在将行为还原为潜在机制的风险，无论这些建议是否伴随着行为观察。许多激进的行为主义者将行为理解为一个离散的单位，从而导致反应强度概念中反映出来的概念错误。建议采用摩尔观点作为替代方案，它解释了行为的时间扩展性质，并避免了基于反应强度的方法的危险。