This paper uniquely demonstrates the scope for profitable collusion on transport costs under delivered pricing. In addition to being profitable, such collusion is shown to be more stable than price collusion and harder to detect as it presents to authorities as continued Bertrand price competition. Such collusion generates endogenous duopoly locations outside the quartiles with less stable but more profitable collusion happening toward the endpoints. These results emerge in both the traditional model of inelastic demand and an extended model of elastic demand.

中文翻译：

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有利可图的成本合谋：空间模型

本文独特地展示了在交付定价下对运输成本进行有利可图的勾结的范围。除了有利可图之外，这种勾结比价格勾结更稳定，更难被发现，因为它向当局展示了持续的 Bertrand 价格竞争。这种勾结会在四分位数之外产生内生的双头垄断位置，在端点处发生不太稳定但更有利可图的勾结。这些结果出现在非弹性需求的传统模型和弹性需求的扩展模型中。