We inquire experimentally whether asymmetric information in competitive settings and competition per se influence individual social behaviour. Participants perform a task and are remunerated according to two schemes, a non-competitive and a competitive one, then they play a standard public goods game. In the first scheme participants earn a flat remuneration, in the other they are ranked according to their performance and remunerated accordingly. Information about ranking and income before the game is played varies across three different treatments. We find that competition per se does not affect the amount of contribution. The time spent to choose how much to contribute is negatively correlated with the decision of cooperating fully. The main result is that full information about the relative performance in the competitive environment enhances the cooperation, while partial information reduces it.

我们通过实验询问竞争环境和竞争本身中的不对称信息是否会影响个人的社会行为。参与者执行一项任务，并根据两种方案（一种非竞争性方案和一种竞争性方案）获得报酬，然后参加标准的公益游戏。在第一个计划中，参与者获得固定的报酬，在另一个计划中，参与者根据其表现进行排名并相应地获得报酬。在玩游戏之前，有关排名和收入的信息在三种不同的处理方式中有所不同。我们发现竞争本身并不影响捐款额。选择做出多少贡献所花费的时间与充分合作的决定负相关。