This paper investigates the financial market´s perception regarding the effectiveness of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe. Do investors believe that centralized supervision adds value compared to multiple supervision? . Do they feel uncertain about the supervisory role of the ECB? To answer these questions, a sample of 118 European Banks has been used finding that whereas in early dates the market reaction was positive reflecting the expectation of greater stability, it turned negative at the time the scope of the supervision was limited to only a group of banks. As might be expected, the reaction is significantly more negative for the directly supervised entities, anticipating a different and more demanding style of supervision that could lead to higher cost. This negative wealth effect is intensified for banks with higher price-to-book ratios or those located in countries with more developed financial systems and better investor protection. However, solvency and productivity firm indicators or low levels of perceived corruption moderate it. This research not only highlights the doubts and uncertainty of investors about the final applications of the SSM, but it could be also useful for policy makers and regulators in order to achieve a more harmonized supervision that improves the credibility of the systems and promote financial stability.

本文研究了金融市场对欧洲单一监管机制有效性的看法。投资者是否认为集中监管比多重监管能增加价值？。他们是否对欧洲央行的监管作用感到不确定？为了回答这些问题，我们使用了118家欧洲银行的样本，发现尽管早期市场反应是积极的，反映出人们对更大稳定性的期望，但当监管范围仅限于一组时，它就变成了负面。银行。可以预见，对于直接监管的实体而言，这种反应明显更为负面，因为他们期望采用一种不同且要求更高的监管方式，这可能导致更高的成本。对于具有较高市净率的银行或位于金融体系更发达且投资者保护水平更高的国家的银行，这种负面财富效应会加剧。但是，有偿付能力和生产力的公司指标或较低的可察觉腐败程度可以缓解这种情况。这项研究不仅突显了投资者对SSM最终应用的怀疑和不确定性，而且对决策者和监管者来说也很有用，以实现更加协调的监管，从而提高系统的信誉并促进金融稳定。