Using regulatory focus, the Chief Executive Officer-Top Management Team (CEO-TMT) interface, and upper echelons theories, the present study casts additional light on the competitive action frequency of firms, as determined by their chief executive officers (CEOs) regulatory focus under the contingent effect of the CEO–TMT dissimilarity of informational demographics. Applying regulatory focus and upper echelons theories, this study first hypothesizes how CEO regulatory focus influences competitive action frequency. Next, leveraging CEO–TMT interface research, this study suggests moderating effects on the part of CEO–TMT dissimilarity, across functional background and tenure, and on the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and competitive action frequency. Drawing on a sample of 218 firms from India for a 5-year period (2010–2015), we find that a CEO promotion focus enhances a firm’s competitive action frequency and that a prevention focus diminishes the same. Furthermore, dissimilarities in terms of both CEO–TMT functional background orientation and tenure in the organization moderate this relationship. This study concludes with a discussion of the article’s theoretical and practical implications.

本研究利用监管重点，首席执行官-高层管理团队（CEO-TMT）界面和高层梯队理论，进一步研究了企业的竞争行动频率，这取决于其首席执行官（CEO）监管重点在CEO–TMT信息人口统计学差异的偶然影响下。运用监管重点和高层理论，本研究首先假设CEO监管重点如何影响竞争行为频率。接下来，利用CEO-TMT的接口研究，该研究表明，在职能背景和任职期间，对CEO-TMT差异的适度影响，以及对CEO监管重点和竞争行为频率之间关系的调节。抽取5年内（2010-2015年）来自印度的218家公司的样本，我们发现，以CEO晋升为重点可以提高公司的竞争行动频率，而以预防为重点则可以减少这种情况。此外，CEO-TMT的职能背景定位和组织任期方面的差异也缓解了这种关系。本研究以对本文的理论和实践意义的讨论作为结尾。