Some philosophers claim that emotions are, at best, hindrances to the discovery of evaluative truths, while others omit them entirely from their epistemology of value. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. Drawing an evaluative parallel with Frank Jackson’s Mary case, I show there is a distinctive way in which emotions epistemically enhance evaluative judgment. This is, in fact, a conclusion philosophers of emotion have been eager to endorse. However, after considering several influential proposals—such as the view that emotions generate evaluative concepts, or the view that emotions justify evaluative beliefs on the model of perception—I conclude that the most promising contender is the notion that emotional experience acquaints us with evaluative properties.

一些哲学家声称情感充其量是发现评价真理的障碍，而另一些哲学家则完全从其价值认识论中忽略了它们。但是，我认为这是一个错误。得出与弗兰克·杰克逊（Frank Jackson）的玛丽案类似的评估结果，我展示出一种独特的方式可以使情感在认识论上增强评估能力。实际上，这是情感哲学家们渴望认可的结论。但是，在考虑了几个有影响力的建议后，例如，情感产生了评价概念，或者认为情感证明了对感知模型的评价信念是正确的，我得出结论，最有前途的竞争者是情感体验使我们了解评价属性的概念。 。