We examine whether and how firm-level promotion tournament incentives for executives, measured by the pay gap between a chief executive officer (CEO) and non-CEO executives, vary in different corporate life-cycle stages. Results show that managerial tournament incentives are higher in growth and mature life-cycle stages than in introduction and decline stages. In additional analyses, we find that firms design compensation contracts for growth and mature life-cycle stages with a target to increase tournament incentives for non-CEO executives that induce managerial risk-taking behaviour, leading to high productivity and performance.

JEL Classification: G30, M12

我们研究了根据首席执行官（CEO）与非CEO高管之间的薪酬差距衡量的，针对企业高管的公司级晋升激励机制在不同的企业生命周期阶段是否有所不同。结果表明，管理性锦标赛激励在成长和成熟生命周期阶段要比引进和衰退阶段要高。在其他分析中，我们发现公司为增长和成熟生命周期阶段设计补偿合同，其目标是增加对非CEO高管的锦标赛激励，这些诱因会诱发管理冒险行为，从而提高生产率和绩效。

JEL分类：G30，M12