Separatism, representationalism, and phenomenal intentionalism are the primary views on the relationship between the phenomenality and intentionality of experience. I defend a novel position that is incompatible with separatism, can enrich representationalism and phenomenal intentionalism, but can also be accepted independently of those views. I call it phenomenal schematics: The phenomenal characters of our experiences have structures that place a priori, formal, and sometimes semantic constraints on our experience's possible intentional contents. Phenomenal structures are like the grammar of a language (or the compositional rules governing maps, models, and diagrams). Unlike words, however, phenomenal characters possess their “grammatical properties” essentially.

中文翻译：

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彩虹的尽头：意识体验的结构、特征和内容

分离主义、再现主义和现象意向主义是关于经验的现象性和意向性之间关系的主要观点。我捍卫一个与分离主义不相容的新颖立场，它可以丰富再现主义和现象意向主义，但也可以独立于这些观点而被接受。我称之为现象示意图：我们经验的现象特征具有对我们经验可能的意向内容施加先验的、形式的、有时是语义的约束的结构。现象结构就像语言的语法（或管理地图、模型和图表的组合规则）。然而，与单词不同的是，现象字符本质上具有它们的“语法属性”。