This paper studies environmental corruption via a random‐matching evolutionary game between a population of firms and a population of bureaucrats who have to decide whether to release a ‘green’ licence to the firms. A firm obtains the licence if the bureaucrat checks that it complies with environmental regulations, otherwise it is sanctioned. The model assumes that there are two types of bureaucrats (honest and dishonest), two types of firms (compliant and non‐compliant) and two possible crimes (corruption and extortion). Corruption occurs when a dishonest bureaucrat accepts a bribe from a non‐compliant firm, while extortion occurs when a dishonest bureaucrat claims a bribe from a compliant firm. When there is no dominance of strategies, we show that there exist two bi‐stable regimes, in which two attractive stationary states exist and two regimes with an internal stable equilibrium, corresponding to the mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium of the one‐shot static game, surrounded by closed trajectories. From comparative statics analysis performed on the latter two dynamic regimes, it emerges that policy instruments may help the Public Administration reduce both corruption and extortion, although increasing sanctions and detection probability do not always get the desired results.

中文翻译：

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演化博弈中的（不诚实的）官僚和（不合规的）公司

本文通过一组企业和一组官僚之间的随机匹配的演化博弈研究环境腐败，这些博弈者必须决定是否向企业发放“绿色”许可证。如果官僚检查其遵守环境法规，则该公司将获得许可，否则将受到制裁。该模型假设存在两种官僚（诚实和不诚实），两种类型的公司（合规和不合规）以及两种可能的犯罪（腐败和勒索）。当不诚实的官僚接受来自不合规公司的贿赂时，就会发生腐败，而当不诚实的官僚从合规公司中贿赂时，就会发生勒索。当没有策略占主导地位时，我们表明存在两种双稳态机制，其中存在两个有吸引力的平稳状态，两个内部稳定平衡的状态，对应于一次静态静态博弈的混合策略纳什平衡，并由封闭的轨迹包围。从对后两种动力机制进行的比较静态分析可以看出，政策手段可以帮助公共行政部门减少腐败和勒索，尽管增加制裁力度和发现概率并不一定总能获得预期的结果。