We consider a model in which schools and colleges compete for high‐ability students, which are independently identified through a costly screening procedure. This independence creates a channel through which students' preferences affect the strategic interaction between schools: students with competing offers accept the most‐preferred one, increasing the screening costs of unpopular schools. When preferences between schools are more heterogeneous, schools screen more, increasing the proportion of students with multiple offers, but paradoxically reducing the extent to which their preferences determine their outcomes. By observing the students' schools of origin, colleges can free‐ride of the fierce competition that occurs during screening.

中文翻译：

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竞争性筛选和信息传递

我们考虑一种模式，在这种模式下，学校和大学会竞争高能力的学生，而这是通过昂贵的筛选程序独立确定的。这种独立性创造了一种渠道，通过该渠道学生的偏好会影响学校之间的战略互动：具有竞争性报价的学生会接受最受青睐的报价，从而增加了不受欢迎的学校的筛选成本。当学校之间的偏好更加不同时，学校会进行更多的筛选，从而增加具有多个录取通知书的学生的比例，但是反而降低了他们的偏好决定其结果的程度。通过观察学生的出身学校，大学可以摆脱筛选过程中发生的激烈竞争。