This paper combines a sequential bargaining game between an enterprise and a fixed number of banks with a signaling game through which the enterprise reveals her project quality as well as her market-speed on the lending market. We characterize subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium loan contracts that are supported by separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in the signaling game. In contrast to existing models of lending markets, low-quality investment projects might be rewarded with more favorable equilibrium loan contracts than high-quality projects. Also in contrast to existing models, an increase in the competitive pressure between banks reduces the aggregate welfare in our model. The reason is that more favorable loan conditions come with a greater incentive for the ‘strong’ entrepreneur to distinguish herself from her ‘weak’ counterpart through socially wasteful signaling costs.

中文翻译：

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用信号讨价还价贷款合同

本文将企业与固定数量银行之间的顺序讨价还价博弈与信号博弈相结合，企业通过该博弈揭示其项目质量以及其在贷款市场上的市场速度。我们描述了子博弈完美纳什均衡贷款合同的特征，这些合同通过在信号博弈中分离完美贝叶斯均衡得到支持。与现有的贷款市场模式相比，低质量的投资项目可能会比高质量的项目获得更优惠的均衡贷款合同。同样与现有模型相比，银行之间竞争压力的增加降低了我们模型中的总体福利。