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Thinking inside the box: Optimal policy towards a footloose R&D‐intensive firm
Journal of Public Economic Theory ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-27 , DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12478
Gerda Dewit 1 , Dermot Leahy 1
Affiliation  

We derive the optimal policy mix of Research and Development (R&D)‐subsidies and corporate tax rates towards a footloose R&D‐intensive firm. Increasing R&D‐subsidies strengthens the firm's incentive to offshore production. The firm's home government can offset this by offering an appropriate corporate tax concession. The optimal policy package exhibits a “Matthew principle”: higher R&D‐subsidies should typically be accompanied by lower tax rates. However, if the R&D‐subsidy exceeds a crucial threshold, a tax concession can no longer prevent offshoring. We find that it is never optimal to raise tax rates as R&D‐subsidies increase.

中文翻译:

框内思考:针对研发密集型公司的最优政策

我们将研发和研发补贴与公司税率的最优政策组合推向了研发密集型公司。不断增加的研发补贴增强了公司对海上生产的激励。公司的母国政府可以通过提供适当的公司税收减免来弥补这一点。最优政策方案体现了“马修原则”:较高的研发补贴通常应伴随较低的税率。但是,如果研发补贴超过关键阈值,税收减免将无法阻止离岸外包。我们发现,随着研发补贴的增加,提高税率从来都不是最佳选择。
更新日期:2020-10-27
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