This paper examines the effects of various labor market institutions (policies) on the welfare of workers and employers. We consider self‐enforcing contracts between risk‐averse workers and risk‐neutral employers in a labor market with search frictions. Employers promise to smooth out shocks to wages while workers promise long‐term commitment to employers. In this environment, regulatory policies can make it easier or harder for employers to keep their promise of wage smoothing, thus influencing the benefit accruing to each party. In our approach, we analyze the joint effect of policies by distinguishing between the financing and spending of funds used in the regulation of the labor market. With regard to financing, layoff tax strictly dominates hiring and payroll taxes on efficiency grounds, whereas the relative ranking of hiring and payroll taxes depend on the type of equilibrium that realizes. On the spending side, while unemployment payment increases workers' welfare at the expense of employers, in‐work benefit in the form of a one‐off wage subsidy leaves workers' welfare intact but may increase the welfare of employers.

中文翻译：

---

自我执行合同下的劳动力市场监管

本文研究了各种劳动力市场制度（政策）对工人和雇主福利的影响。我们考虑在劳动力市场中由于搜寻摩擦而规避风险的工人与风险中立的雇主之间的自我执行合同。雇主承诺消除对工资的冲击，而工人承诺对雇主的长期承诺。在这种环境下，监管政策可以使雇主更容易或更难地履行其工资平滑承诺，从而影响到各方应得的利益。在我们的方法中，我们通过区分用于调节劳动力市场的资金的融资和支出来分析政策的共同效果。在融资方面，基于效率的考虑，裁员税严格控制着招聘税和工资税，而招聘税和工资税的相对排名取决于实现的均衡类型。在支出方面，虽然失业救济金以牺牲雇主的名义增加了工人的福利，但以一次性工资补贴的形式提供的在职福利却保留了工人的福利，但可能会增加雇主的福利。