A common view of retail finance is that conflicts of interest contribute to the high cost of advice. Within a large sample of Canadian financial advisors and their clients, however, we show that advisors typically invest personally just as they advise their clients. Advisors trade frequently, chase returns, prefer expensive and actively managed funds, and underdiversify. Advisors' net returns of −3% per year are similar to their clients' net returns. Advisors do not strategically hold expensive portfolios only to convince clients to do the same; they continue to do so after they leave the industry.

中文翻译：

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财务顾问的误导信念

零售金融的普遍观点是，利益冲突会导致高昂的咨询费用。但是，在大量加拿大财务顾问及其客户的样本中，我们表明，顾问通常会像为客户提供建议一样进行个人投资。顾问经常交易，追逐收益，偏爱昂贵且积极管理的基金，并且投资分散。顾问每年的净收益为−3％，与客户的净收益相似。顾问在战略上并不持有昂贵的投资组合，只是为了说服客户这样做。他们离开该行业后继续这样做。