In a rapidly growing industry, potential entrants strategically choose which local markets to enter. Facing the threat of additional entrants, a potential entrant may lower its expectation of future profits and delay entry into a local market, or it may accelerate entry due to preemptive motives. Using the evolution of local market structures of broadband Internet service providers from 1999 to 2007, we find that the former effect dominates the latter after allowing for spatial correlation across markets and accounting for endogenous market structure. On average, it takes 2 years longer for threatened markets to receive their first broadband entrant. Moreover, this entry delay has long‐run negative implications for the divergence of the U.S. broadband infrastructure: 1 year of entry delay translates into an 11% decrease on average present‐day download speeds.

中文翻译：

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进入威胁，进入延迟和互联网速度：美国宽带部署的时机

在快速发展的行业中，潜在进入者从战略上选择要进入的本地市场。面对新进入者的威胁，潜在进入者可能降低其对未来利润的期望并延迟进入本地市场，或者由于先发动机而可能加速进入。利用1999年至2007年宽带互联网服务提供商本地市场结构的演变，我们发现，在考虑到整个市场之间的空间相关性并考虑了内生性市场结构之后，前者的影响主导了后者。平均而言，受威胁的市场要接收第一个宽带进入者要花费2年以上的时间。此外，这种进入延迟对美国宽带基础设施的差异具有长期负面影响：