This paper studies a dynamic bargaining model with informational externalities between bargaining pairs. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the price for their work while its cost is agents' private information and is correlated between them. Depending on the equilibrium, information from the other pair helps or hinders principals' ability to offer low prices. A higher correlation can then either increase or decrease principals' payoffs, delay, and welfare.

中文翻译：

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与信息和收益外部性进行讨价还价

本文研究了在讨价还价对之间具有信息外部性的动态讨价还价模型。两位委托人与各自的代理人就其工作价格进行讨价还价，而其成本则是代理人的私人信息，并且在他们之间相互关联。根据均衡，来自另一对的信息有助于或阻碍委托人提供低价的能力。然后，更高的相关性可以增加或减少本金的回报，延迟和福利。