This paper reviews experimental studies on the so‐called “hold‐up problem.” Common features in the experimental design and results are summarized. Most experimental studies show evidence of the hold‐up problem, but to an extent less severe than what standard self‐interest model predicts. Hold‐up occurs at the individual level, but exhibits a less severe pattern than theoretically predicted at the aggregate level. A positive correlation is found between the investment stage decisions and subsequent bargaining behavior. Social preferences largely influence the results in hold‐up games. Remedies that enhance the effect of social preferences can effectively alleviate the hold‐up problem. These laboratory findings are also relevant to real‐life hold‐up situations, but differences in the specific institution and environment may require more variations in the experimental design.

中文翻译：

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实验经济学文献中的保留问题调查

本文回顾了有关“保持问题”的实验研究。实验设计的共同特点和结果进行了总结。大多数实验研究都表明存在滞留问题的证据，但程度不及标准的自利模型所预测的严重。滞留发生在个人层面，但表现出的程度不如理论上在总体层面上预测的严重。在投资阶段的决策和随后的讨价还价行为之间发现正相关。社会偏好在很大程度上影响着保持游戏的结果。可以增强社会偏好效应的补救措施可以有效地缓解滞留问题。这些实验室发现也与现实生活中的滞留情况有关，