A disparate literature hypothesizes what can broadly be described as the common‐enemy effect: the fact that the interaction with a common enemy (formed by Nature, an individual, or a group) increases cooperation. This review identifies the multidisciplinary antecedents of this effect, and then distinguishes between several strands of literature applying noncooperative game theory to account for it. A first strand argues that the threat posed by a common enemy makes each player's cooperative effort more critical. In a second strand a behavioral common‐enemy effect caused by group interaction is studied experimentally. A third strand models the common‐enemy effect as the formation of a coalition of players against another player in a contest. A fourth strand formalizes the principle that the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’, either in a model of social relations, interdependent altruistic preferences, or indirect reciprocity in repeated games. The connections between these strands of literature are investigated, and questions for future research are proposed.

中文翻译：

---

共生效应：多学科前因和经济观点

各种各样的文献提出了可以被广泛描述为“共敌效应”的假设：与共同敌人（由大自然，个人或团体组成）的互动增加了合作的事实。这篇综述确定了这种效应的多学科前因，然后区分了应用非合作博弈论来解释它的几条文献。第一线认为，共同敌人构成的威胁使每个玩家的合作努力变得更加关键。在第二条链中，实验研究了由群体相互作用引起的行为共病效应。第三部分将共同敌人效应建模为比赛中选手与另一选手的联盟形成。第四部分正式化了“我的敌人的敌人是我的朋友”的原则，在社会关系模型，相互依存的利他主义偏好或重复博弈中的间接互惠中。研究了这些文献之间的联系，并提出了需要进一步研究的问题。