The future of defined benefit (DB) pensions is a hotly debated topic in reward management. Drawing on agency and managerial power theories, the conditions under which CEOs can affect their sustainability have been examined. We show that when the CEO is a member of the same DB plan as their employees or when the CEO is both a member and a trustee of the plan, this affects the agency and power dynamics increasing the likelihood of these plans being retained. To address endogeneity concerns, we mimic randomisation using propensity score matching and the results continue to hold. Using the introduction of pension tax penalties as an exogenous shock on CEO self-interest, we find that it affects the propensity of DB plan closures. The study highlights the key role that CEO incentives play on pension–provision decisions and indicates how HR practitioners/regulators can harness CEO self-interest to safeguard the sustainability of DB pension plans.

中文翻译：

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CEO 在固定收益养老金计划可持续性中的作用

固定收益 (DB) 养老金的未来是奖励管理中一个激烈争论的话题。借鉴代理和管理权力理论，研究了 CEO 影响其可持续性的条件。我们表明，当 CEO 与其员工是同一个 DB 计划的成员时，或者当 CEO 既是该计划的成员又是该计划的受托人时，这会影响代理和权力动态，从而增加了保留这些计划的可能性。为了解决内生性问题，我们使用倾向评分匹配模拟随机化，结果继续成立。将养老金税收处罚的引入作为对 CEO 自身利益的外生冲击，我们发现它会影响 DB 计划关闭的倾向。