Abstract

Conscientious objection has achieved a particular place in contemporary law and culture. Lawyers, political theorists, ethicists, health professionals and others have debated how we best negotiate the tensions that can exist between professional obligations and private beliefs. Conscientious objection to abortion care has been a particular focus of these discussions. In this article, we draw on theoretical work on ‘jurisdiction’ to provide an account of what is embedded in claims to conscience and what the effects of such claims are. We focus specifically on refusals of abortion care enabled by section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967. We argue that legitimating narratives on conscience seek to achieve seemingly contradictory goals: entrenching abortion as morally ambiguous while securing it as part of medicine’s monopolistic practice. While section 4 provides the focus, our concerns extend to the wider landscape and impact of claims to conscience. Through our jurisdictional analysis, we seek to better understand such claims and dramatically reorient thinking by grounding the conscience clause squarely in the politics of ‘task areas’, professional domains, market control and claims of epistemological authority.

中文翻译：

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良心，堕胎和管辖权

摘要

出于良心拒服兵役在当代法律和文化中占有特殊地位。律师，政治理论家，伦理学家，卫生专业人员和其他人士一直在争论我们如何最好地解决职业义务与私人信仰之间可能存在的紧张关系。出于良心拒服人工流产一直是这些讨论的重点。在本文中，我们利用有关“管辖权”的理论工作来说明良心主张中所包含的内容以及此类主张的影响。我们特别关注1967年《堕胎法》第4条所规定的拒绝堕胎护理。我们认为，关于良心的合法叙事试图实现看似矛盾的目标：在道德上将堕胎确立为模棱两可，同时确保堕胎成为医学垄断做法的一部分。尽管第4节提供了重点，但我们的关注范围扩展到更广泛的领域以及对良心主张的影响。通过我们的管辖权分析，我们试图通过在“任务区”，专业领域，市场控制和认识论权威的主张中立足良知条款，以更好地理解此类主张并大幅重新定位思维。