ABSTRACT

The new countervailing duty proceeding rule of the United States on exchange rates aims to address currency undervaluation through a subsidy tool under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. As there is no prohibition in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) making macro-economic policies off-limits from the reach of subsidy norms, exchange rates can be subject to countervailing duty proceedings. However, there are specific requirements to be met under the ASCM and World Trade Organization jurisprudence. Most notably, the new countervailing duty proceeding rule arguably fails to meet the ‘benefit’ analysis requirements. It takes into account the effect that negatively weighs on foreign exporters subject to a countervailing duty proceeding while ignoring the one that positively weighs. This skewed benefit analysis of selective nature is difficult to sustain under the ASCM and its jurisprudence. A more detailed and thorough benefit analysis is needed to make this new scheme work in a World Trade Organization (WTO)–consistent manner. The new countervailing duty rule showcases structural problems addressing macro-economic policies through a subsidy framework.

中文翻译：

---

讲故事一半—美国新CVD规则中的选择性收益评估

摘要

美国关于汇率的新反补贴税程序规则旨在通过《补贴与反补贴措施协议》下的补贴工具解决货币低估问题。由于《补贴与反补贴措施协议》（ASCM）中没有禁止将宏观经济政策排除在补贴规范范围之外的规定，因此汇率可能要缴纳反补贴税。但是，ASCM和世界贸易组织的判例需要满足一些特定的要求。最值得一提的是，新的反补贴税程序规则可能无法满足“收益”分析要求。它考虑到对负有反补贴税程序的外国出口商造成负面影响的结果，而忽略了对其具有正面影响的出口者。在ASCM及其判例下，这种对选择性性质的偏向收益分析很难维持。为了使这一新计划以世界贸易组织（WTO）一致的方式运作，需要进行更详细，彻底的收益分析。新的反补贴税规则展示了通过补贴框架解决宏观经济政策的结构性问题。